security: fix vulnerabilities and harden code (2026-03-12)
Path traversal fixes: - DeleteFile.js: use path.resolve() + symlink protection (CRITICAL) - DeleteFileFolder.js: add path.resolve() validation + symlink check (CRITICAL) - RenameFile.js: use path.resolve() with proper prefix check + symlink guard (HIGH) - attachments.js: add baseDir validation + skip symlinks in recursive search (MEDIUM) XSS fixes: - dashboard.js: escape user input in onerror/onclick inline attributes (HIGH) - paramadminsettingsetup.script.js: escape values in innerHTML template (MEDIUM) Input validation: - inputValidationMiddleware.js: block suspicious requests instead of logging only (MEDIUM) Version bump: 1.2.2-beta → 1.2.3-beta
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@@ -26,8 +26,25 @@ router.post('/:folderName', authMiddleware, (req, res) => {
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const userId = req.userData.name;
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const { filename } = req.body;
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const userFolderPath = path.join('cdn-files', userId || '');
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const filePath = path.join(userFolderPath, req.params.folderName, filename || '');
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if (!userId || !filename) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Paramètres manquants.' });
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}
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const userFolderPath = path.resolve('cdn-files', userId);
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const filePath = path.resolve(userFolderPath, req.params.folderName, filename);
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if (!filePath.startsWith(userFolderPath + path.sep)) {
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Accès non autorisé.' });
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}
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try {
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const stat = fs.lstatSync(filePath);
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if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) {
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Accès non autorisé.' });
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}
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} catch (e) {
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return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Le fichier spécifié n\'existe pas.' });
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}
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if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
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return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Le fichier spécifié n\'existe pas.' });
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