security: fix vulnerabilities and harden code (2026-03-12)
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Path traversal fixes:
- DeleteFile.js: use path.resolve() + symlink protection (CRITICAL)
- DeleteFileFolder.js: add path.resolve() validation + symlink check (CRITICAL)
- RenameFile.js: use path.resolve() with proper prefix check + symlink guard (HIGH)
- attachments.js: add baseDir validation + skip symlinks in recursive search (MEDIUM)

XSS fixes:
- dashboard.js: escape user input in onerror/onclick inline attributes (HIGH)
- paramadminsettingsetup.script.js: escape values in innerHTML template (MEDIUM)

Input validation:
- inputValidationMiddleware.js: block suspicious requests instead of logging only (MEDIUM)

Version bump: 1.2.2-beta → 1.2.3-beta
This commit is contained in:
2026-03-12 20:18:28 +01:00
parent 1fbfc28780
commit a8af857cd3
8 changed files with 101 additions and 35 deletions

View File

@@ -156,19 +156,30 @@ router.post('/', authenticateToken, (req, res) => {
return res.status(400).json({ message: 'User ID or filename missing for file deletion.' });
}
const userFolderPath = path.join('cdn-files', userId);
const userFolderPath = path.resolve('cdn-files', userId);
function findAndDeleteFile(folderPath) {
const resolvedFolder = path.resolve(folderPath);
if (!resolvedFolder.startsWith(userFolderPath + path.sep) && resolvedFolder !== userFolderPath) {
return false;
}
const filesInFolder = fs.readdirSync(folderPath);
for (const file of filesInFolder) {
const filePath = path.join(folderPath, file);
const resolvedFilePath = path.resolve(filePath);
if (!filePath.startsWith(userFolderPath)) {
if (!resolvedFilePath.startsWith(userFolderPath + path.sep)) {
return false;
}
if (fs.statSync(filePath).isDirectory()) {
const stat = fs.lstatSync(filePath);
if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) {
continue;
}
if (stat.isDirectory()) {
const fileDeletedInSubfolder = findAndDeleteFile(filePath);
if (fileDeletedInSubfolder) {
return true;